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Markets and democracy are "the twin pillars" of prevailing development orthodoxy.' 
Many have explored the ways - "theoretical, historical, and empirical"- in which these two 
pillars are said to reinforce each other.2 By contrast, this Article will focus on an inherent 
instability in free market democracy. 
For a long time, leading political philosophers and economists held that market 
capitalism and democracy could coexist, if at all, only in fundamental tension with one another.3 
Markets would produce enormous concentrations of wealth in the hands of a few, while 
democracy, by empowering the poor majority, would inevitably lead to convulsive acts of 
expropriation and confiscation. In Adam Smith's words, "For one very rich man, there must be 
at least five hundred poor . ... The affluence of the rich excites the indignation of the poor, who 
1 Professor of Law, Duke University. For their helpful comments, I would like to thank Bruce 
Ackerman, Owen Fiss, Gerry Gunther, Henry Hansmann, Tom Heller, Donald Horowitz, Mark Kelman, 
Gerald Neuman, Jed Rubenfeld and the participants in workshops at the University of Chicago and 
Columbia University. 
2 Jagdish Bhagwati, Democracy and Development: New Thinking on an Old Question 29-32 
( 1995); see LESTER C. THuROW, THE FlmJRE OF CAPIT AUSM 1-5 (1996); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, 
DEMOCRACY REALIZED 3 ( 1998). I have described elsewhere the recent explosion of interdisciplinary 
work on marketization and democratization in the developing world. See Amy L. Chua, Markets, 
Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 14-19 
(1998). 
3 Larry Diamond, Democracy and Economic Reform: Tensions, Compatibilities, and Strategies for 
Reconciliation, in ECONOMIC TRANSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA: REALITIES OF REFORM 107, 
108 {Edward P. Lazear ed. 1995); see, e.g., PETER BERGER, THE CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 73 (1986) 
(describing the contemporaneous rise of capitalism and democracy in Europe and the United States); 
ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 168 (1998) (suggesting that market-capitalism "creates a large middling 
stratum of property owners" who "are the natural allies of democratic ideas and institutions"); Diamond, 
supra, at 108 (observing that both capitalism and democracy rest on "fundamental principles of competition 
and choice" and are threatened by "excessive concentration of power in the state"); Owen M. Fiss, 
Capitalism and Democracy 13 MICH. J. INT'L L. 908, 911 ( 1992) ("Both notions are rooted in assumption 
of human rationality and self-interest, and thus rely on individual freedom and autonomy as the means for 
achieving their ends"). 
4 See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 403-4 
(1976); THOMAS BABINGTON MACAULAY, COMPLETE WRITINGS, vol. 17, at 263-76 (1900); THE WORKS 
AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO vol. 7, at 369-70 (Peiro Sraffa ed. 1973 ); KARL MARX, THE 
CLASS STRUGGLES IN FRANCE (1848-50), at 69-70 (New York: International Publishers 1934); see 
generally STEFAN COLLIN!, DoNALD WINCH & JOHN BURROW, THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS: A 
STUDY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 102-7 (1983); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO 
ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY 2, 62-73 ( 1985). 
are often both driven by want, and prompted by envy, to invade his possessions."5 Madison 
warned against the "danger" to the rights of property posed by "an equality & universality of 
suffrage, vesting compleat power over property in hands without a share in it. "6 David Ricardo 
was willing to extend suffrage only "to that part of [the people] which cannot be supposed to 
have an interest in overturning the right ofproperty."7 Thomas Babington Macaulay went 
further, portraying universal suffrage as "incompatible with property" and "consequently 
incompatible with civilization."8 From this point of view, free market democracy is a paradox, a 
contradiction in terms. 
But as it turned out, the Paradox of Free Market Democracy did not prove insuperable. 
On the contrary, while "[d]emocracy and market-capitalism are locked in a persistent conflict,"9 
3 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO mE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEAL Til OF NATIONS bk. V, 
ch. I, pl II, at 232 ( 1776) (Chicago ed. 1976). In a more contemporary vocabulary, the "equality of 
franchise in a democratic society creates a tendency for government action to equalize incomes by 
redistributing them from a few wealthy persons to many less wealthy ones." ANTIIONY DOWNS, AN 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 198 ( 1957). 
6 James Madison, Note to His Speech on the Right of Suffrage (1821), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 450, 452 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
7 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO, supra note_, at 369-70. 
1 MACAULAY, supra note_, at 268. 
I am far from wishing to throw any blame on the ignorant crowds ... We ourselves, with all the 
advantages of education, are often very credulous, very impatient, very short-sighted, when we are 
tried by pecuniary distress or bodily pain .... Imagine a well-meaning laborious mechanic fondly 
attached to his wife and children. Bad times come. He sees his wife whom he loves grow thinner 
and paler every day. His little ones cry for bread; and he has none to give them. Then come the 
professional agitators, the tempters, and tell him that there is enough for everybody, and that he 
has too little only because landed gentlemen, fundholders, bankers, manufacturers, railway 
proprietors, shopkeepers, have too much? Is it strange that the poor man should be deluded, and 
should eagerly sign such a petition as this? The inequality with which wealth is distributed forces 
itself on everybody's notice. It is at once perceived by the eye. The reasons which irrefragably 
prove this inequality to be necessary to the well-being of all classes are not equally obvious . . .. 
. . . And do you believe that as soon as you give the workingmen absolute and irresistible power 
they will forget all this? . . . In every constituent body capital will be placed at the feet of labor; 
knowledge will be borne down by ignorance; and is it possible to doubt what the result must be? .. 
. What could follow but one vast spoliation? One vast spoliation! 
ld. at 271-72, 274. 
9 DAHL, supra note 2, at 173. As Dahl has noted, this conflict "can be understood in two ways: 
Democracy may be seen as a danger to property rights; or property rights may be seen as a danger to 
this conflict has been more or less successfully negotiated throughout the developed world. 
Defining the terms broadly, markets and democracy have coexisted quite healthily in the United 
States for two hundred years, and at least a dozen other developed countries "have remained 
continuously capitalist and democratic for the past half-century."10 That democratic politics 
proved compatible with capitalism in the First World -- that the electoral "power of numbers" 
did not overwhelm the "economic power ofproperty" 11 --is one ofthe great surprises of modem 
history. 12 
Will the Paradox of Free Market Democracy be similarly negotiable in developing 
societies? Through what institutions? What face will the Paradox assume in the developing 
world? Law and development, booming anew today, 13 has systematically ignored this set of 
questions -- a remarkable omission, given the confidence with which democracy and markets are 
being exported all over the Third and postcommunist worlds. 14 
democracy." DAffi.., supra note_, at 68. On the first view, the concern is that "[a] majority made up of 
the less prosperous will be able to use their equality in the state to appropriate the property of the wealthier 
minority." Id. On the second view, the danger is that "a minority of rich will possess so much greater 
political resources than other citizens that they will control the state, dominate the majority of citizens, and 
empty the democratic process of all content." Id. 
10 Adam Przeworski, The Neoliberal Fa/lacy, in CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 
REviSITED 47 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1993). 
11 Claus Offe, Democracy Against the Welfare State?, in MODERNITY ANDlliE STATE 147, 154 
(1996). 
12 For a particularly interesting discussion of the "peaceful" but "precarious" "coexistence between 
democracy and capitalism" in industrialized Western societies, see JORGEN HABERMAS, The New 
Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the Exhaustion of Utopian Energies, in 1liE NEW 
CONSERVATISM 55-56 (1985); see also DAffi.., supra note_, at 166-79 (describing the "antagonistic 
symbiosis" between democracy and market-capitalism); CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS 
159, 161 (exploring ''the close but uneasy relationship between private enterprise and democracy"). For 
economic models exploring the same phenomenon, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE LIMITS OF LIBERTY: 
BETWEEN ANARCHY AND LEVIATHAN 147-65 (1975); DOWNS, supra note_, at 198; Allan H. Meltzer & 
Scott F. Richard, A Rational Theory of the Size of Government, 89 J. POL. ECON. 914, 916 (1981); Sam 
Peltzman, The Growth ofGovernment, 23 J. L. & ECON. 209, 222-23 (1980). 
13 See generally Chua, supra note_, at 8-21 (describing the new law and development movement 
and comparing it to the law and development movement ofthe 1960s and 1970s); John H. Merryman, 
Comparative Law and Social Change: On Origins, Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development 
Movement, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 457,472-83 (1977) (describing and critiquing the earlier movement). 
14 The self-confidence characteristic oftoday's law reform efforts in the developing world 
contrasts jarringly with the self-questioning (and in some cases self-flagellation) that accompanied the 
decline of the earlier law and development movement, the basic thrust of which was also to export 
democratic capitalism to the developing world. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in 
Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 
1974 WIS. L. REv. 1062, 1070, 1080. As a number of commentators have suggested, the angst about 
"cultural imperialism" in the 1960s and 1970s was in significant part a product of the Vietnam War. See, 
e.g., Richard Bilder & Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Lessons of Law-and-Development Studies, 89 AM. J. I NT' L 
L. 4 70 ( 1995). Similarly, the absence of self-doubt today probably reflects the collapse of the former Soviet 
Union and the sense (at least in the West) that there is no acceptable alternative to the Western 
developmental paradigm. 
This Article makes four points. The first, in the nature of a hypothesis that I will try to 
make plausible but will not be able to prove, is that the Paradox of Free Market Democracy in 
the developed world is and always has been mediated by a host of devices substantially de-
escalating the conflict between market-generated wealth disparities and majoritarian politics. 
These devices, while varying widely across nations, generally fall into three categories: material, 
political, and ideological. 
Materially, in all the developed nations, the less well-off have essentially been "bought 
out," in part through market-generated material prosperity, but also in significant part through 
strong networks of redistributive institutions. 1 5 Politically, in addition to a long history of 
massive exclusions from the suffrage, Western nations have a variety of institutions that restrain 
majoritarian confiscatory impulses, including separation of powers and constitutional property 
protections. 16 Finally, these "buy-outs" and political restraints have been supplemented, perhaps 
crucially, by the existence of various market-compatible ideologies- belief-systems that make 
the less well-off majority more inclined to accept or at least not to rebel against the extreme 
income disparities produced in a market economy. Probably the most prominent of these 
ideologies in the United States is that of upward mobility.17 
(To avoid misunderstanding, I am not concerned with the origins of these mediating 
institutions and ideologies. For example, I am not making the functionalist claim that market-
compatible ideologies emerged in the developed nations because the Paradox of Free Market 
Democracy "demanded" them. My concern, rather, is with effects- in particular, with the 
neutralizing impact that these institutions and ideologies have had on the conflict between 
markets and majoritarian politics.) 
Second, these developed-world mediating devices are largely absent from the developing 
world, and there is no reason to assume that they will be spontaneously generated by market and 
democratic reforms. On the other hand, many developing countries do have one highly effective 
restraint on democracy: systemic political corruption. In recent years, anti-corruption initiatives 
have become a major thrust of international development policy. These initiatives are long 
overdue and of the utmost importance, but to the extent that they succeed, they will sharpen the 
conflict between markets and democracy. 18 
Third, in critical respects, the Paradox of Free Market Democracy is much more 
dangerous and potentially explosive in the developing world. To begin with, in terms of sheer 
numbers, the poor are vastly more numerous, and poverty far more entrenched, in the developing 
world today than in the developed world, either today or at analogous historical periods. 19 In 
15 See infra TAN -
16 See infra TAN 
17 See infra TAN 
18 See infra TAN -
19 See infra TAN -
addition, universal suffrage is generally being implemented in the developing world on a rapid, 
large-scale basis that contrasts sharply with the very gradual and incremental enfranchisement 
characteristic of the history of Western democratization.20 Moreover, perhaps most 
fundamentally, in stark contrast to both the Western nations and all the East Asian "Tigers," 
many developing countries have one or more ethnic minorities who, along with foreign 
investors, will tend under market conditions to economically dominate the "indigenous" 
majorities around them, at least in the near to midterm future. 21 The existence of such market-
dominant minorities, together with other conditions prevalent throughout the developing world, 
converts the Paradox of Free Market Democracy into an engine of potentially catastrophic 
ethnonationalism. In these circumstances, democracy will often mobilize majoritarian 
ethnoeconomic resentment into powerful nationalist movements potentially subversive of both 
markets and democracy themselves.22 
Thus, the Paradox of Free Market Democracy often has an entirely different face in the 
developing world. The ethnic and racialist structures of the developed world typically help 
defuse the conflict between markets and democracy, essentially by fracturing the poor majority. 
In the United States, for example, racism (together with a thriving ideology of upward mobility) 
arguably makes poor and lower middle class whites feel more "kinship" with wealthy whites 
than with African-Americans or Hispanic-Americans of comparable economic status. As a 
result, racism in the United States creates no particular threat to a market economy. On the 
contrary, to the extent that racism helps reconcile a great number of poor and working class 
whites to the prevailing economic hierarchy (because there is a group still lower than they) and 
impedes political coalitions among the poor, racism helps to mediate the Paradox of Free Market 
Democracy .23 
By contrast, the distinctive overlapping of class and ethnicity characteristic of many 
developing countries-- in which the "very rich" are (or are perceived as) ethnically distinct--
tends to catalyze the Paradox of Free Market Democracy, with democracy pitting an 
"indigenous" majority against an economically dominant "outsider" minority.24 This dynamic is 
not a mere theoretical possibility in the developing world. It is a persistent, lethal reality, as 
recent events in Indonesia have once again illustrated. 25 
Finally, for all these reasons, it is irresponsible to promote markets and democracy in the 
developing world in the absence of institutions capable of mediating the conflict between them. 
To be sure, today's prevailing policy approach to law and development does include proposals 
20 See infra TAN -
21 See infra TAN -
22 See infra TAN -
23 See infra TAN -
24 See infra TAN -
25 See infra TAN -
that, if successful, would replicate some of the devices that have helped mediate the Paradox of 
Free Market Democracy in the developed world-- for example, "social safety nets" and 
constitutional property protections. But these policies do not grapple with the distinctive and 
most dangerous aspects of the Paradox of Free Market Democracy as it presents itself in the 
developing world, such as the much more massive extent of poverty, the rapidity of 
democratization, and the problem of market dominant minorities. 
Part I of this Article will explore the material, political, and ideological devices that have 
helped mediate the conflict between markets and democracy in the developed world. While 
some of these devices will also be desirable in the developing world, others surely will not be. 
One of the most important challenges facing developing world policymakers is to think much 
more carefully about how the developed world "solved" the Paradox of Free Market Democracy 
and whether these "solutions" could -- or should - exist in the developing world. 
Part II will show how certain conditions characteristic of developing societies make the 
Paradox of Free Market Democracy especially problematic and combustible. Contemporary 
Indonesia is offered as a paradigmatic example. Weimar Germany is also discussed here, as a 
rare instance in which a Western nation pursued-- with catastrophic ethnonationalist 
consequences -- free market democracy under conditions in many respects analogous to those 
characteristic of many developing countries today. 
Part III will explore policies that might be capable of grappling with the Paradox of Free 
Market Democracy as it presents itself in the developing world. The policies I propose will 
focus on the problems of market dominant minorities and ethnonationalism just described --
problems that the latest law-and-development panaceas (rule oflaw, state-building, judicial 
independence, civil society) do not address and in certain circumstances may even aggravate. If 
markets and genuine democracy are to coexist in the developing world, it will be crucial to find 
ways to give large numbers of the impoverished majority a stake in the market economy, and in 
particular, an interethnic market economy. 
While the Paradox of Free Market Democracy will not be ethnicized everywhere in the 
developing world, the proposed policies will, with some adjustment, have bearing for all 
developing and post-communist countries. 1bis is so not only because all developing countries 
pursuing market and democratic reforms will have to find ways to mediate the basic conflict 
between market-generated wealth disparities and majoritarian politics. More important, in 
virtually all developing and post-communist countries, foreign investors -who tend to prosper 
disproportionately under economic liberalization, often provoking nationalist, anti-market 
sentiment - occupy a role analogous to that of economically dominant minorities. 
